Just for
laughs, one more brief post on the philosophy of humor. (Two recent previous posts on the subject can
be found here and here.)
Let’s talk about the relationship between rationality and our capacity to find things amusing.
First, an
important technicality. (And not exactly
a funny one, but what are you gonna do?)
Recall the distinction within
Scholastic metaphysics between the essence
of a thing and its properties or
“proper accidents” (where the terms “essence” and “property” are used by
Scholastics in a way that is very different from the way contemporary analytic
metaphysicians use them). A property or
collection of properties of a thing is not to be confused with the thing’s
essence or even any part of its essence.
Rather, properties flow or follow from a thing’s essence. For example, being four-legged is not the
essence of a cat or even part of its essence, but it does follow from that
essence and is thus a property of cats; yellowness and malleability are not the
essence or even part of the essence of gold, but they flow from that essence
and are thus properties of gold; and so forth.
A property is a kind of consequence
or byproduct of a thing’s essence,
which is why it can easily be confused with a thing’s essence or with part of
that essence. But because it is not in
fact the same as the essence, it can sometimes fail to manifest if the
manifestation is somehow blocked, as injury or genetic defect might result in
some particular cat’s having fewer than four legs. (See pp. 230-35 of Scholastic Metaphysics for more detailed discussion.)
Now, a stock Scholastic example of a property or proper accident is risibility or the capacity for laughter, which is a property of human beings insofar as it flows from rational animality, which is our essence. (Note that the capacity in question here is not merely the capacity to make a certain laughter-like noise, as a hyena might. Rather, it is the capacity to react with that noise to something regarded as funny.)
Again, it is
not our essence or nature to be risible. Rather, our essence is to be rational
animals. Still, we exhibit risibility because we are rational. Risibility is a consequence or byproduct of
our rational animality. Hence it is because
man is a rational animal that he is also a risible animal. The fact that humor does not exist in other,
non-rational animals lends credence to this judgment.
Suppose we
accept this standard Scholastic view (which is expressed by thinkers like
Aquinas). It naturally raises the question
of why risibility follows upon rationality. What exactly is the connection between them?
Here it
seems to me that the incongruity theory
of humor has an advantage over its rivals, additional to the other advantages which
(as I indicted in the earlier posts) I think speak in its favor. The basic idea of the incongruity theory, you’ll
recall, is that we find something funny when we detect in it some kind of
anomalous juxtaposition or combination of incompatible elements (though as I’ve
also noted, this idea requires various qualifications).
Now, notice
that, in order to detect such an incongruity, you need to be able to grasp concepts. For example, to see the humor in something like
(to take a pretty random example) the “Gandhi II” sequence in the otherwise forgettable “Weird Al” Yankovic
movie UHF, you have to grasp the
concept of nonviolence, its association with Gandhi, the concept of an action
movie, the concept of a movie sequel, etc., and the anomalousness of these
being combined in just the way they are in that sequence. But the grasp of concepts is the core of
distinctively intellectual or rational capacities. (See this
article, reprinted here.) So, the incongruity theory explains the link
between rationality and risibility.
Other
theories of humor arguably fail in this regard.
For example, the release theory
of humor holds that finding something funny involves the release of tension or
pent-up feelings. But non-rational
animals can experience a kind of tension -- think of a trapped horse panicking
in the face of danger, or a frustrated dog trying to get to some food or to the
mailman’s leg -- yet exhibit no risibility upon its release.
Or consider
the play theory. I suggested in one of the earlier posts that,
rightly understood, the play theory should be regarded as an account of the psychological
function humor plays in human life,
rather than as an account of why we take things to be funny. But suppose we interpreted it in the latter
way -- as a claim to the effect that we find things funny when they afford some
pleasure or relaxation. One problem with
such a proposal is that some animals exhibit playful behavior, but without exhibiting
anything like a sense of humor about it.
It might
seem that the superiority theory of
humor can also account for the relationship between rationality and
risibility. It holds that finding
something funny involves a feeling of superiority over and contempt for others. And surely only a rational animal can feel
superiority or contempt?
But there
are a couple of problems with this suggestion. First, as some critics of the theory
have pointed out, it isn’t clear that the laughter associated with contempt
really involves finding anything funny. Just as we can cry with sadness but also with
joy, so too it seems that laughter can be associated with very different
psychological states.
But even if
there is some connection between the laughter involved with contempt and the
finding of something to be funny, there is another problem with the suggestion
that superiority is the key to our
finding things funny (as opposed to something merely occasionally and contingently
associated with finding something funny).
Or at least it is a problem if we accept certain other aspects of the Aristotelian-Thomistic
conception of human nature. Man is not
only a risible animal, but also a social
animal. We are not atomistic individuals
of the sort described by Hobbes (who was, as it happens, an advocate of the
superiority theory of humor). Our natural
relationship to others is not one of seeking advantage, either via domination or
contract. But it seems that risibility
considered as a manifestation of superiority or contempt could be a proper
accident or property of human beings only if they did have this Hobbesian nature.
Hence the idea that risibility is a proper accident tells against the superiority
theory.
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